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EFFECT THAT THEY WERE TO DISREGARD THE
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES, AND ALSO
THAT SAID INSTRUCTION PERMITS THE JURY TO
ASSESS AS A PART OF VALUE FUTURE PROFITS
NOT YET EARNED AND HIGHLY SPECULATIVE.
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 12 AND 13; THAT SAID INSTRUCTIONS IN EFFECT PERMITTED THE JURY TO ASSESS
AS VALUE THE RETAIL PRICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
LOTS IN PARCEL 1.
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MERVIN WALLACE AND JOSEPH BENEDICT, AS TO
VALUATION OF PARCEL 1.
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I N D E X—(Continued)
Page
(H) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO
GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
5 AND THAT SAID INSTRUCTION CORRECTLY
STATES THE LAW AS IT CONCERNS A WILLING
SELLER.
POINT II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED THE JURY TO CONSIDER AND TO ASSESS
DAMAGES TO THE WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN
THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:
39-45
(A) THE COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED THE
WITNESS, ULLRICH, TO TESTIFY AS TO VALUES OF
THE WATER DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION
SYSTEM.
(B) THE COURT IMPROPERLY RECEIVED EXHIBIT
39D PERTAINING TO VALUES OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE EVIDENCE
OF THE WITNESSES, BRAYTON AND ULLRICH AS
TO VALUES OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
(D) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO
GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
19.
(E) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED THE WITNESS BRAYTON TO TESTIFY AS
TO VALUES AS HE WAS NEITHER AN EXPERT NOR
AN OWNER.
POINT III. THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED
THE PLAINTIFF AS TO THE EVIDENCE PROFERRED BY
AND PROPOSED TO BE GIVEN BY THE WITNESSES,
SOLOMON AND ASHTON
45-46
POINT IV. THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AND PERMITTED THE JURY TO
ASSESS AS VALUE THE STREETS WITHIN THE PROPERTY; THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO
GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS.
14 AND 15 AS TO OWNERSHIP OF PLATTED STREETS
46-48
POINT V. THAT THE COURT GAVE NO INSTRUCTION
AS TO BURDEN OF PROOF AND IMPROPERLY REFUSED
TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2
DEALING THEREWITH
48-50
POINT VI. THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED
INTEREST AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN COMPUTING
THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE
VERDICT ON NOVEMBER 5, 1954
51-52
CONCLUSION
53

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I N D E X—(Continued)
Page
CASES CITED
A. D. Graham & Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. (Pa.) 33
A. 2d 22
44
Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. Gorman (Va.) 61 S. E. 2d 33
27
Boskovich v. Midvale City (Utah), 243 P. 2d 435
47
Catlin v. Northern Coal and Iron Co. (Pa.) 74 Atl. 56
24
City & County of Denver v. Tondall (Colo.), 282 Pac. 191
34
City of Los Angeles v. Hughes (Cal.) 262 Pac. 737
32
City of Napa v. Navoni (Cal.) 132 P. 2d 566
34
East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v. Kieffer (Cal.) 278 Pac. 476
33
Kansas City & Topeka Ry. Co. v. Splitlog (Kan.) 25 Pac. 202
29
Kinter v. United States, 156 F. 2d 5, 172 A.L.R. 232
42
Nantakala Power & Light Co. v. Moss (No. Car.) 17 S.E. 2d 10
34
Pennsylvania S.V.R. Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 468
25
People v. LaMacchia (Cal.) 264 P. 2d 15
33
Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.
2d 777
44
Redwood City Elem. School Dist. v. Gregoire (Cal.) 276 P. 2d 78
38
State v. Bird & Evans, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 276, 265 P. 2d 639
47
State v. Cerruti (Ore.) 214 P. 2d 346
35
State v. Danielson (Utah) 247 P. 2d 900
52
State v. Deal (Ore.) 233 P. 2d 242
35
State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630
3, 14, 40, 46, 51, 52
Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irr. Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584.. 21
Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irr. Co., 239 U.S. 323, 60 L.Ed. 307.. 50
Thornton v. Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545, 7 A.L.R. 2d
773
~
34
Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P. 2d 343
34
Union Exploration Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist. (Colo.) 89
P. 2d 257
34
United States v. 3,544 Acres of Land, 147 F . 2d 596
25
Wassenich v. City & County of Denver (Colo.) 186 Pac. 533
30
White v. Salt Lake City (Utah) 239 P. 2d 210
47
STATUTORY REFERENCES
Laws of Utah, 1951, First Special Session, Chapter 13, Section 2
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 63-11-10, as amended by
Chapter 122,1953 Session Laws

3
47

TEXTS CITED
18 Am. Jur. on Eminent Domain, Section 242, page 875
20
18 Am. Jur. on Eminent Domain, Section 244, page 881
23
29 C J . S . on Eminent Domain, Section 137, page 974
20
29 C J . S . on Eminent Domain, Section 160, page 1027
24
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 12.2(1), page 32
20
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 12.3142(1), page 109 and
107
22

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION, D. H. Whittenburg, Chairman, H. J. Corleissen and Layton
Maxfield, Members of the ENGINEERING COMMISSION,
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[
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TON F. PEEK and CHARLES D. I
WIMAN, Trustees under the Will \
and of the Estate of CHARLES 1
H. DEERE, Deceased,
I
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/

No. 8290

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was commenced by the State of Utah
to condemn certain property for This Is The Place
Monument Park. The direction of the Legislature in this
respect was positive and the language of the statute
1
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dealt not only with the end result but also with procedure
and is worthy of quotation, as follows :
There is appropriated out of the emergency relief
fund to the Engineering Commission the sum of
three hundred thousand dollars to pay the amount
of the judgment or judgments, costs, appraisal
fees and other expenses incident to the condemning and acquisition of the lands referred to in
Section 8 hereof. The amount to be expended
under this appropriation shall not exceed the
amount awarded by the court as judgment or
judgments and costs and the expenses in the proceedings to be instituted for the condemning of
said lands. I t is further expressly provided that
in the event the said judgment or judgments, costs
and expenses shall exceed the amount of three
hundred thousand dollars the State Board of
Examiners shall allocate out of the reserve building fund to the Engineering Commission such
additional amount as may be necessary to pay
said judgment or judgments, costs, appraisal fees
and expenses incident thereto. Provided further
that any owners of any part or all of the land
described in Section 8 hereof, may on or before
July 15, 1951 submit in writing an offer to sell
said land to the State of Utah to said Engineering
Commission, together with warranty deed and
Abstract of Title or suitable title insurance to
said property. If said offer is approved by said
Commission within 20 days after receipt thereof,
the same shall be presented to the State Board
of Examiners by said Commission for their consideration. If approved by said Board of Examiners, the same shall be purchased by said
Engineering Commission and paid for upon approval of title, the same as herein provided, for
satisfaction of judgment of condemnation. Otherwise, said deed and abstract shall be returned to

2
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said offeror and the property condemned as
herein provided. The Engineering Commission
shall not delay the institution and prosecution of
said action to condemn on account of the foregoing provision, but shall dismiss said action as
against any property purchased by the State
pursuant to its provisions. Laws of Utah, 1951,
First Special Session, Chapter 13, Section 2.
All of the property within the area has been secured
by the State of Utah and payment made therefor except
that belonging to the respondents here; but it is notable
that the property of these respondents comprises the
major portion of the property ordered condemned by
the Legislature (Ex. 1).
This condemnation proceeding was commenced in
accord with the above statute and summonses were
served and the effective date for the determination of
damage became July 12, 1951, which date appears often
in the record as the date upon which the appraisers
estimated the damage suffered by the owners of the
property involved.
It should be here noted that this action was tried to
a jury in May of 1952 and a judgment rendered in favor
of the respondents and that that judgment in the sum
of $495,986.40 has been paid to the respondents (K. 43).
An appeal was taken by the Deere estate and resulted
in this Court granting a new trial upon the question of
damages only. The opinion of this Court is reported as
the case of State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 2 $ , 265 P. 2d 630. The
present appeal is by the State from a jury verdict and
3
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a judgment thereon in the total additional sum of
$192,821.19 (R. 96-99).
The property of the respondent as shown by Exhibit
1 consists of all of the property within the park area
except that portion shown in white on the map, (Exhibit
1) and by the pretrial order of the District Court was
divided into eight parcels for convenience in presenting
the case to the jury. These eight parcels are marked on
Exhibit 1 and are given separate colors. Prior to the
trial, counsel for the State of Utah and for the respondents, Deere Estate, agreed as to the values that
could be placed on five of these parcels, but, as to Parcels
1, 2 and 3 and the value to be placed on the water distribution system, the appraisers were not in agreement
and it was this phase of the case that was submitted to
the jury. I t might be pointed out here that the statute
authorizing and directing this condemnation proceeding
in effect permitted settlement of values with the various
owners only if the owner agreed with the figures and
amounts determined upon by the state appraisers; and
it should be here noted that the amount agreed upon as
to values for Parcels 4 to 8, both inclusive, were the
figures of the state appraisers.
I t also appears proper to note that the major difference in values between the parties concerns Parcel 1
and the water distribution system and that, as to Parcel
1, the difference lies in the approach made by the appraisers to this problem of value. This difference in
approach is particularly apparent in the testimony of
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the respondent's witness, Ealph Wright, commencing on
page 191 of the record in this case and continuing
through page 204 of the record. This difference is again
reflected in the testimony of H. Mervin Wallace, a witness
for respondent, from page 261 through page 267 of the
record, and again in the testimony of respondent's witness, Joseph Benedict, at pages 296 through 299 of the
record.
Again, with respect to Parcel 1, the three appraisers
for the Deere Estate all arrived at a figure of value
slightly in excess of $300,000.00; the witnesses for the
State of Utah values this same property at three dif- .
ferent amounts, namely $163,250.00, $148,883.00, a n d ^ 7 ^
$169,000.00. The record is clear that the approach used
/
by the two sets of appraisers was entirely different and
this approach caused this disparity in the amounts. The
£}uM^A^
appraisers for the respondent took each lot within this - ^ •
area as a separate parcel of land, valued it as such on / / • ~~
the basis of a retail sale to the ultimate home builder f
r^
and gave no allowance or consideration to any of t h e y 7 ^ * ^
costs involved, to the time element or to the profit for ~%£**«>
the risk to the owner buyer. The appraisers for the ***4*/*^**K
State considered these items and based their appraisal % cc&4#*
upon the market value of the entire tract as one parcel
in accordance with the pretrial order of the District
Court.
The witness, Edward M. Ashton, testifying for the
State, said:
"Ordinarily, the profits on a real estate subdivision is the last end of it. Many of them are
5
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extended over many years, and I would say, as a
rule of practice, the last twenty-five percent of
the lots is that portion of the deal that is the
profit." (E. 420).
This evidence is not contradicted and is again emphasized by the testimony of each of the appraisers to
the effect that the subdivision business is one full of
risks that the owner must take.
The jury in this case returned a verdict of $82,927.00
for the water works and water rights owned by the respondents in connection with the Oakhills development
(E. 93). The evidence as to water and its value was
confined to the testimony of the witness, C. J. Ullrich,
and the witness, Dean F. Brayton. The witness, Ullrich,
testified as to the value of the water right itself and
placed a value of $16,500.00 on it (E. 312). The State
does not contend that this was improper and we recognize that the appellants are entitled to recover for this
water right reduced by the amount sold to Wheelwright
as testified to by Mr. Brayton (E. 320). This places a
net value of $11,290.00 on the water right.
However, the witness, Ullrich, placed a value of
$57,200 on the water works (E. 313) and $19,700.00 on
the distribution system (E. 314). There was no evidence
as to how this water works and water system could be
otherwise used except as given by the witness, Ullrich
(E. 311), where he stated that the water collection and
transmission system had no use at the time of the condemnation except to serve the area condemned but that
it could be adapted to other uses. The evidence as to
6
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this adaptation and the cost thereof was entirely lacking,
yet the evidence of value was placed before the jury over
the objection of the State.
And, in addition, Mr. Brayton, over the objection
of the State, was permitted to testify as to the cost of
the water distribution system (R. 317-321), and Exhibit
39 was introduced, over the State's objection, showing
these detailed costs, which included an item of ten percent increase in cost which admittedly was never paid
or incurred by the respondents (R. 328-330).
The respondent's appraisers each testified that their
valuation of the lots within Parcel 1 were based upon
the utilities present or absent and each specifically stated
that the presence of the water distribution system was
reflected in their figures and its absence would have resulted in a lowering of their figures (R. 231, R, 261, and
R. 296). Based upon this, the State moved to strike all
of the evidence as to this water distribution and transmission system and this motion was denied (R. 332).
We have endeavored in this statement of facts to
cover the general picture and wTe have purposely omitted
any reference to the instructions given or the failure
to give certain instructions as it is necessary to fully
discuss them in the argument following. We have in a
few other instances omitted in this statement of facts
matters that might properly be there but they again
appear necessary to fully state in the argument. This
brief is rather long and it is our desire to avoid repetition where it is possible to do so.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THAT THE TRIAL COUET IMPROPEELY HELD
AND INSTRUCTED THE JUEY THAT THE RESPONDENTS WEEE ENTITLED TO EECOVEE
DAMAGES UPON SIXTY-TWO SEPAEATE LOTS
WITHIN PAECEL 1, EACH TO BE SEPAEATELY
VALUED AND THEN TOTALLED FOE THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING DAMAGE AS TO PAECEL 1;
AND EEEOE IS PEEDICATED UPON EACH OF
THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC POINTS IN THIS
CONNECTION:
(A) THAT THIS ACTION OF THE TEIAL
COURT WAS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION
TO THE PRETRIAL ORDER OF THE COURT.
(B) THAT THE COUET IMPEOPEELY GAVE
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 AND INSTRUCTED THE
JURY IN EFFECT THAT THEY WERE TO
DISREGARD THE EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES, AND ALSO THAT SAID
INSTRUCTION PERMITS THE JURY TO
ASSESS AS A PART OF VALUE FUTURE
PROFITS NOT YET EARNED AND HIGHLY
SPECULATIVE.
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 12 AND 13; THAT SAID
INSTRUCTIONS IN E F F E C T PERMITTED
THE JUEY TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE RETAIL PRICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL LOTS IN
PARCEL 1.
(D) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 IN THAT AGAIN THE
PURPORT OF SAID INSTRUCTION GIVES TO
THE DEFENDANTS A FUTURE P R O F I T
8
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HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND NOT YET
EARNED; AND THE EFFECT OF SAID INSTRUCTION IS TO UNDERWRITE AN UNEARNED PROFIT FOR THE DEFENDANTS.
(E) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10, 11 AND 12; THAT
SAID INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY STATE
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONDEMNATION
AND FAILURE TO GIVE SAID INSTRUCTIONS PERMITTED THE JURY TO ASSESS
DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF 60 ODD INDIVIDUAL PARCELS IN PARCEL 1 RATHER
THAN ONE PARCEL.
(F) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
DENIED THE MOTION OF APPELLANT TO
STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES, RALPH WRIGHT, D. MERVIN WALLACE
AND JOSEPH BENEDICT, AS TO VALUATION
OF PARCEL 1.
(G) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 AS SAID INSTRUCTION
DOES NOT CORRECTLY DEFINE A WILLING
SELIJER.

(H) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 AND THAT SAID INSTRUCTION CORRECTLY STATES THE LAW
AS IT CONCERNS A WILLING SELLER.
POINT II.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED THE JURY TO CONSIDER AND TO
ASSESS DAMAGES TO THE WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:
9
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(A) THE COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED
THE WITNESS, ULLRICH, TO TESTIFY AS
TO VALUES OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION
AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
(B) THE COURT IMPROPERLY RECEIVED
EXHIBIT 39D PERTAINING TO VALUES OF
THE WATER DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
THE EVIDENCE OF THE WITNESSES, BRAYTON AND ULLRICH AS TO VALUES OF THE
W A T E R D I S T R I B U T I O N S Y S T E M AND
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
(D) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION NO. 19.
(E) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
PERMITTED THE WITNESS BRAYTON TO
T E S T I F Y AS TO VALUES AS HE WAS
NEITHER AN EXPERT NOR AN OWNER.
POINT III.

THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED THE
PLAINTIFF AS TO THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED
BY AND PROPOSED TO BE GIVEN BY THE WITNESSES, SOLOMON AND ASHTON.
POINT IV.
THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AND PERMITTED THE JURY
TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE STREETS WITHIN
THE PROPERTY; THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S RE10
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QUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 14 AND 15 AS TO
OWNERSHIP OF PLATTED STREETS.
POINT V.
THAT THE COURT GAVE NO INSTRUCTION AS
TO BURDEN OF PROOF AND IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 DEALING THEREWITH.
POINT VI.
THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED INTEREST AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN COMPUTING THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE VERDICT ON NOVEMBER 5, 1954.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY HELD
AND INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER
DAMAGES UPON SIXTY-TWO SEPARATE LOTS
WITHIN PARCEL 1, EACH TO BE SEPARATELY
VALUED AND THEN TOTALLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSESSING DAMAGE AS TO PARCEL 1;
AND ERROR IS PREDICATED UPON EACH OF
THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC POINTS IN THIS
CONNECTION:
(A) THAT THIS ACTION OF THE TRIAL
COURT WAS IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION
TO THE PRETRIAL ORDER OF THE COURT.
(B) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 AND INSTRUCTED THE
JURY IN EFFECT THAT THEY WERE TO
11
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DISREGARD THE EVIDENCE OF PLAINT I F F ' S WITNESSES, AND ALSO THAT SAID
INSTRUCTION P E R M I T S THE JURY TO
ASSESS AS A PART OF VALUE FUTURE
PROFITS NOT YET EARNED AND HIGHLY
SPECULATIVE.
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 12 AND 13; THAT SAID
INSTRUCTIONS IN E F F E C T PERMITTED
THE JURY TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE RETAIL PRICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL LOTS IN
PARCEL 1.
(D) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 IN THAT AGAIN THE
PURPORT OF SAID INSTRUCTION GIVES TO
THE DEFENDANTS A FUTURE P R O F I T
HIGHLY SPECULATIVE AND NOT YET
EARNED; AND THE EFFECT OF SAID INSTRUCTION IS TO UNDERWRITE AN UNEARNED PROFIT FOR THE DEFENDANTS.
(E) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10, 11 AND 12; THAT
SAID INSTRUCTIONS CORRECTLY STATE
THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONDEMNATION
AND FAILURE TO GIVE SAID INSTRUCTIONS PERMITTED THE JURY TO ASSESS
DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF 60 ODD INDIVIDUAL PARCELS IN PARCEL 1 RATHER
THAN ONE PARCEL.
(F) THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
DENIED THE MOTION OF APPELLANT TO
STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES, RALPH WRIGHT, D. MERVIN WALLACE
AND JOSEPH BENEDICT, AS TO VALUATION
OF PARCEL 1.
12
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(G) THAT THE COUET IMPEOPEELY GAVE
INSTEXJCTION NO. 10 AS SAID INSTEUCTION
DOES NOT COEEECTLY DEFINE A WILLING
SELLEE.
(H) THAT THE COUET IMPEOPEELY EEFITSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S BEQUESTED
INSTEUCTION NO. 5 AND THAT SAID INSTEUCTION COEEECTLY STATES THE LAW
AS IT CONCEENS A WILLING SELLEE.
We have set forth in the statement of points under
Point I eight subparagraphs each dealing with a specific
issue before the trial court wherein we maintain that
error was committed. However, the applicable lawT would
indicate that all eight should be combined for the purpose
of argument. The specific issue can be rather briefly
stated in two parts: First, is the respondent entitled to
a valuation of its property based upon a mere mathematical total of the appraised retail value of each of
sixty-two separate building lots, or must the appraisal
be made upon the whole parcel of land as one tract for
sale on the open market; and, second, as a corollary to
the first question, does the respondent here meet the
definition of a willing seller when it insists that the
value must be based upon the individual building lot
for sale to the ultimate consumer, the home owner.
It should be here pointed out that upon the first trial
of this case, the entire property of the respondent was
divided into only two parcels. Parcel 1 consisted of
approximately the same property as Parcel 1 in this
case; and Parcel 2 in the first trial comprised the remainder of the entire tract (Exhibit 1). The Deere
13
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Estate, appellant in the first appeal, argued the propriety of this division, and this Court, in the case of
State v. Peek, supra, said, at page 638 of the Pacific
Eeporter:
" T h e court did not err in dividing this property
into only two parcels instead of six requested by
appellants. Parcel I as the property was divided
by the court was the same as appellants' requested
Parcel I, and the court divided the rest of appellant's lands which were taken into Parcel I I . Appellants argue that where land is platted into
residential lots each lot constitutes as a matter of
law a separate parcel, but they are not in a position to urge this here because they have requested
no such division. Parcel I, which is the same as
their proposed Parcel I, contains all of the platted
residential lots. All of those lots were platted
and were being used as a unit in a project to
divide and sell such lots as residential property
and the court wTas therefore justified in making
the division as it d i d . "
The pretrial order in the present case, among other
things, made the following statement:
" . . . 4. The primary question for determination
i s : What was the fair market value on the 12th
day of July, 1951, of the tract of land belonging
to the Deere Estate and taken by the State of
Utah in this proceeding.
" 5 . Incident thereto, for the purposes of trial,
and orderly and systematic procedure, in presenting evidence of value and avoiding confusion
in the considerations and deliberation of the jury,
is the question of classifying or dividing the lands
in sections or parcels similar in conditions, pos14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sible uses, value standards, etc., at the time of the
taking, to-wit: July 12, 1951."
The order then describes 8 parcels and makes reference
to Exhibit 25 of the previous trial. Exhibit 1 of the
present trial was agreed to by the parties and each of
the 8 tracts described in this pretrial order was given
a special coloring on Exhibit 1.
We did not take issue with this pretrial order as the
division into 8 parcels for the purpose of presenting
the evidence seemed proper and within the trial court's
discretion; but we urge upon this Court that the dividing
of Parcel 1 into sixty-two separate building lots for
purpose of valuation and instructing the jury that they
should so consider them, was a direct contradiction of
the pretrial order and is contrary to the law applicable
to condemnation cases. At all phases of this proceeding,
counsel for the State strenuously objected to this method
of valuation.
Appellant objected to the giving of Instruction No.
9 (E. 517). By that instruction the trial Court told the
jury that they should disregard all of the evidence
prof erred by the State's appraisers and that they should
consider each of the sixty-two lots as a single parcel (R.
79). Appellant objected to the giving of Instructions
Nos. 12 and 13 (R. 517). Again, those instructions in
effect informed the jury that they could and should value
each lot in Parcel 1 individually based upon the testimony of the appraisers for respondents and that their
verdict should be a mathematical total of all of the sixty15
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two lots in Parcel 1. We objected to the giving of Instruction No. 17 (E. 517), and again by this instruction
the Court informed the jury that "you are not to take
into consideration any speculative increase or decrease
in values that may occur or have occurred in the future;
nor any consideration of future tax or sale commission
that might be paid for future sales, . . . nor possible
future expenses that defendants be saved by selling now ;
nor any interest the defendants might be saved or be
entitled to receive . . . " (E. 88).
The appellant requested certain instructions and
those particularly pertinent here are those designated
ajs Plaintiff's Eequested Instructions Nos. 10, 11, and
12. (E. 65, 66 and 67). The trial court has noted on each
of these instructions that they were given in substance
or were covered in other instructions. We most strenuously urge that they were not so covered, but on the
contrary the language of the instructions given and referred to above were directly opposed to those instructions requested; and we objected to the court's refusal
to give these requested instructions (E. 518).
Specifically, in our Eequested Instruction No. 10 the
value of each of the Parcels involved was "to be measured by the fair market value of such parcel as an entirety
as of July 12, 1951 . . . " Our Eequested Instruction No.
11 reads as follows:
"You are not to consider what the land was worth
to the defendants for speculation, or for merely
possible uses, nor what they claim it was worth
16
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to them, nor what it would sell for under special
or extraordinary circumstances, but you are to
find the fair market value of each of the Parcels
1 to 8 as of July 12, 1951, if offered in the market
under ordinary circumstances; that is to say, the
price at which an owner of each of said parcels,
under no compulsion, would have been willing to
take for it on July 12, 1951, if he desired to sell,
and which a buyer, under no compulsion, who
desired and was able to buy, would have been
willing to pay."
And in our Eequested Instruction No. 12 we most definitely asked that the jury be told that they could not
separately assess each lot, in the following words:
" I n assessing the value of any of the parcels you
are not to value separately any platted lot or lots
therein. You may take into consideration that on
July 12, 1951, a plat of a portion of Parcel 1 had
been filed with the county and the purposes for
which said platted portion and all other portions
of Parcel 1 were most suitable, but your value
must be the value of the whole of Parcel 1, the
platted and unplatted portions taken together as
one unit. And you are further instructed that you
may not arrive at your verdict by an addition of
all of the contemplated lots in said tract or tracts,
but you are confined to an evaluation of the whole
of each parcel of land as a unit for the highest
and best purpose to which it was adaptable by
these defendants on the date in question.'" (Italics
ours)
The italicized part of the foregoing instruction is directly
contrary to the instructions as given and particularly as
to Instructions Nos. 9, 12, 13, and 17 as given. We will
17
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hereinafter demonstrate that the requested instructions
are the proper ones in condemnation proceedings.
Also, at the conclusion of the respondent's case, tlite
State of Utah moved to strike from the record all the] >
evidence of values submitted by the witnesses for the) ^
respondent as to Parcel 1 for the reason that such evi-f
dence was in violation of the pretrial order and wa$
contrary to the law as it relates to evidence in condemnation cases (R. 316).
And finally it is our contention that the giving of
Instruction No. 10 (R. 80) and the failure to give our
Requested Instruction No. 5 (R. 60) constitutes prejudicial error. Proper objections were made (R. 517 and
518), and we contend that the instruction given does not
properly define a willing seller and a willing buyer and
that the instruction not given does constitute the proper
definition.
We respectfully urge upon this Court that the theory
of the respondents, which was adopted by the trial court
and contained in his charge to the jury, did not provide
for just compensation for the taking of the property
involved; but this theory permitted recovery by the
respondents of future speculative profits without any
regard for any items of cost in connection therewith. It
was conceded that the subdivision business is one of risk
and there was no evidence offered that in any way contradicted the statement made by the witness, Ashton, to
the effect that it was the sale of the last twenty-five per18
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cen of a subdivision that constituted the profit of the
promoter.
Yet, in this present case, not only did the respondents
recover for that last twenty-five percent in full but with. out any risk and without the necessity of spending one
penny in costs, which admittedly they would have incurred if they had been permitted to proceed with the
sales of the lots in the subdivision. The record reveals
that Mr. Dean Brayton and Mr. A. B. Paulsen were
acting for the respondents, the one as it managing agent
and the other as its architect and planner; their services
were continuous and certainly not free. In addition there
were other employees needed from time to time. At the
time a lot within the subdivision was sold, the respondents
would be required to furnish abstracts of title, to place
revenue stamps on the deed of conveyance, and to pay a
sales commission to the realtor securing the buyer. If
the selling of the subdivision extended over any period
of time, there would be additional taxes; and in a transaction of this kind, interest on the investment and a profit
to the promoter for his risk, for his know-how and for
his time are involved. None of these items were considered by the appraisers for the Deere Estate who came
up with a figure which represented a mathematical total
of the retail value that they placed on each individual
lot within Parcel 1. The State appraisers considered all
of these items in arriving at their result, but the trial
court did not even permit the jury to consider this approach and directed that they could not consider these
items by Instructions No. 9 and 17.
19
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4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 12.2(1) at
page 32, defines market value, as follows:
" B y fair market value is meant the amount of , v^
money which a purchaser willing but not obliged 19
to buy the property would pay to an owner
willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into consideration all uses to which the land was adapted
and might in reason be applied."
29 C.J.S. on Eminent Domain, Section 137 at page
974, gives this definition of market value:
" T h e market value of property injured or taken
for public use is commonly defined as the price
\/
it will bring when offered for sale by one wTho 0 *
desires, but is not required, to sell, and is sought
by one who desires, but is not required to buy,
after due consideration of all the elements reasonably affecting value."
And in 18 Am. J u r . on Eminent Domain, Section 242
at page 875, this definition of market value is given :
" W h e n a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, the measure of compensation to be awarded ^ \J
the owner is the price which would be agreed upon ™ *
at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to
sell and a purchaser willing to buy; in other words
the test is the fair market value of the l a n d . "
Ealph Wright, testifying as an expert appraiser for
the respondents, at page 160 of the record, gave his definition as follows:
" F a i r market value is the highest price, expressed
in terms of money, which a property will bring if
exposed for sale in the open market, allowing a
reasonable time to find a purchaser who buys with
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full knowledge of all the uses to which it is
adapted and capable of being used, both buyer /t± / \
and seller acting intelligently and willingly without compulsion."
Mr. Wallace in his evidence for the respondents used
a very similar definition (R. 234). And Mr. Benedict
stated that he used the same definition as the one that
Mr. Wright did. The appraisers for the State used
similar definitions, that given by Mr. Werner Kiepe (R.
339) and that used by Mr. C. Francis Solomon (R. 468-9)
being almost identical with that given by Mr. Wright.
Mr. Edward M. Ashton gave two definitions of market
value both of which are similar in form and substance
to the definitions heretofore quoted. The problem is n o t \
therefore, to define market value as all of the appraisers |
used the same or similar definitions, but to apply this ^
definition to the case at hand; and we respectfully urge / ;
upon this Court that the application by the respondents' I
appraisers is not correct and does violence to the defi- \
nition and that the evidence in this record consistent
with that definition is that given by the appraisers who J.
testified on behalf of the State of Utah.
To demonstrate the fundamental error in the respondents' theory, may we first call attention to the ever
present use of the term "willing seller" or its equivalent.
I t is our contention that the evidence offered on behalf
of the respondent shows beyond a shadow of a doubt
that they were not a willing seller on the open market,
but rather that they were willing to sell only upon condition that they receive the retail value of each individual
21
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lot and that they would refuse to sell to a willing purchaser offering to buy the entire tract under the terms
of the definitions above quoted.
The question here involved as to whether it is proper
to treat each building lot as a single parcel for purpose
of valuation is inextricably bound up with the proper
application of this definition of fair market value. The
cases we have found and which are hereafter cited deal
witlt analogous situation^ and we have found no case
jvhere the parcel of land is similar to the present fact,
that is, one with a complete subdivision and a contemplated subdmsion within the same tract. However, this
is said to be immaterial; and "while the mere filing of a
subdivision map has been held not to establish the potentiality of the property for building purposes, the
failure to file such a map has been held not to exclude
consideration of such possible use." 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 12.3142(1) at page 109.

^

This same section of 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain
at page 107, contains this statement:
"The most characteristic illustration of the rule j
that market value is not limited to value for the 1
existing use and the situation in which it is most j frequently invoked, and also most frequently I
abused, is found in those cases where evidence is /
offered of what the value of a tract of land that j
is used for agricultural purposes or is vacant and I
unused would be if cut up into house-lots. It is
well settled that if land is so situated that it is
actually available for building purposes, its value j
for such purposes may be considered, even if it 1
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is used as a farm or is covered with brush and
boulders. The measure of compensation is not,
however, the aggregate of the prices of the lots
into which the tract could be best divided, since
the expense of cleaning off and improving the
land, laying out streets, dividing it into lots, advertising and selling the same, and holding it and
paying taxes and interest until all the lots are
disposed of cannot be ignored and is too uncertain
and conjectural to be computed. The measure of
compensation is the market value of the land as
a whole, taking into consideration its value for
building purposes if that is its most available use^
"The possibility for building purposes must not
be entirely remote and speculative, thereby rendering evidence of such use inadmissible; however, the mere fact that there are no buildings on
the land at the time of the taking does not make
such potential use speculative or remote as a
matter of law. While the mere filing of a subdivision map has been held not to establish the
potentiality of the property for building purposes,
the failure to file such a map has been held not to
exclude consideration of such possible use. Nor
may the potential use for sub-division purposes
be excluded merely because the existing use is
purely agricultural."

<^7

18 Am. Jur. on Eminent Domain, Section 244 at page
881, states:
" F o r example, when a tract taken by eminent
domain is used as a farm, the owner is entitled
to have its possible value for building purposes
considered; but the jury or other tribunal is not
to determine how it could best be divided into
building lots, nor conjecture how fast they could
be sold, nor at what price per lot."
23
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A statement to the same effect is found in 29 C.J.S. on
Eminent Domain, Section 160 at page 1027.
An early case, decided by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in 1909, contains a fact situation quite
comparable to the present one. This case of Catlin v.
Northern Coal & Iron Co., 74 Atl. 56, concerned the condemnation of right of way over a tract of 30 acres, 18 of
which were situated on high ground available for build-

j

t

ing lots. This 18 acre tract had been divided into such
lots, and into streets and alleys, which were marked on
the ground, and had offered the lots for sale. There had
been no sales primarily because the asking price was
somewhat greater than the best offer. The main issue
in the case was in connection with admission of evidence
and in the fact that the witnesses were permitted to con-} ylAJu>
sider that the land had been divided into lots and the I
specific question involved, in. t h e case at bar waft noj
d|scuss„ed. However, at page 57 of the Atlantic Eeporter,
the Court said :
" T h e test in every such case is, What was the
market value of the land, at the time of the appropriation, for any available purpose? If it was
then available for sale as building lots, and had
a market value for such purpose at the time of
the entry, it is proper to consider this element
of value in determining what the property was
then worth. All of our cases recognize that the
use to which the land is best adapted may always
be considered in estimating market value. If it
has immediate value for sale as building lots, it
would be a very harsh rule which would deny the
owner the benefit accruing to him by reason of

24
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having his property so favorably located. As we
viewT the case at bar, there is no doubt that a
considerable portion of the land of appellee was
available for sale as building lots, and that it had
a market value as such at the time of the entry.
Under these circumstances it was proper to consider the present value of the land for this use\
at the time of the appropriation. Of course future j
and speculative value as a lot proposition could/
not be considered, and, as we read the testimony/
this rule was not violated."
An earlier Pennsylvania case, Pennsylvania
S.V.R.
Co. v. Cleary, 125 Pa. 442, 17 A. 468, was quoted with
approval in the case of United States v. 8,544 Acres of
Land, 147 F . 2d 596, as follows:
" W e do not agree with the learned judge that
there was any such question for the jury in this
case. The jury are to value the tract of land and
that only. They are not to determine how it could
best be divided into building lots, nor conjecture
how fast they could be sold, nor at what price per
lot. A speculator or investor, in deciding what &&
price he could afford to pay, would consider the
chances and probabilities of the situation as then ^
actually existing. A jury should do the same :
thing. They are not to inquire what a speculator
might be able to realize out of a resale in the
future, but what a present purchaser would be %
willing to pay for it in the condition it is now in.
This is a rule that is well settled, and the court
should have drawn the attention of the jury to it,
so as to have left no room for uncertainty on their
part. They should have been told that they hacff
nothing to do with the subdivision of this tract,
the price of the lots, or the probability of their
sale; but that they were to ascertain the fair sellDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 25
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

mg value of the land before and after the entry
by the railroad company, in order to determine
the actual damage done to its owner."
And in this same federal case, the following charge to
the jury was held proper, at page 598 of the Federal
Reporter:
" O n cross examination witnesses on both sides
were permitted by the Court to be examined concerning the development for which the property
is adapted. This, of course, was to bring out the
testimony as to what this land is best adapted for,
but it was also permitted to see if any witness
based his estimate on the entire tract exclusively
on a basis of individual lots or houses, and if so,
his estimate would have to be excluded from the
j u r y ; but all the witnesses on both sides testified
that their estimates were based on other proper
factors, and for that reason the estimates of the
four witnesses will all be submitted for your consideration, but let me again caution you that you
are to value the tract of l a n d ^ s ^ f j i p r i l 21, 1941,
and that oiily. You are not to determine how it!
could best be divided into building lots, nor con-I
jecture how fast they could be sold, nor at what!
price per lot. You should not inquire what aj
speculator might be able to realize out of a resale!
in the future, but you should consider what a!
purchaser would have been willing to pay for it
on April 21,1941, in the condition it was then i n . " |
The actual fact situation in the foregoing federal
case is not discussed except as it appears from the testimony quoted which indicates that the property involved
was in the City of Philadelphia and that a subdivision
within the city was in some state of development. How-
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ever, in the Virginia case of Appalachian Electric Power
Co. v. Gorman, 61 S.E. 2d 33, at page 36, the Court describes the land involved as follows:
" T h e land over which the easement is taken is
an irregularly shaped tract of 43x/2 acres on the
west side of the Trents F e r r y Eoad about % of a
mile from the city of Lynchburg, Virginia. I t is
described as the finest piece of property close to
Lynchburg for a high-class subdivision for persons desiring to build expensive residences. I t is
located on hilly terrain and readily adapted to
the highest type of subdivision for homes and
residences. Immediately adjacent to it are a number of homes and estates, valued at $25,000 to
$100,000 each. I t is pictured as a natural continuation of one of the finest residential sections
close to Lynchburg, suitable for a high-class subdivision for persons desiring to build expensive
residences. One of the witnesses said it is 'as fine
a piece of property for subdivision as I have seen
anywhere in the United States; and I have subdivided from north and south, east and west.' I t
is bounded by beautiful estates to the east, and a
high-class subdivision borders it on the south,
with many expensive homes. I t is in demand for
residential subdivision and purchasers have already offered to purchase portions of it.
" T h e entire 4 3 % acres have been held intact
without buildings. In 1940 the owners employed
Charles F . Gillette, an experienced landscape
arc
jjjtect 1 to plat th&Jtia.ct into one hundred lots / '
and streets, having the streets follow the natural
contours of the property without following the
usual gridiron type, in order to avoid cuts and N
fills. Trees were. pifmtQd affording to the plan, J
and water and sewer lines were mapped, bids /
being obtained therefor; but these plans were
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halted with the beginning of World War II. City
water is available within 200 feet. Natural gas
lines run along the edge of the property. The land
has been cleared so that prospective purchasers
can obtain a good view of the entire subdivision.
It has a right of way to United States Route 501,
and residents can reach the business center of
Lynchburg within fifteen minutes. It has the advantage of county taxes. A city bus service runs
within 200 yards of the property, and there is a
business center a short distance therefrom. The
property is rural, though suburban to the city of
Lynchburg, with a perfect mountain view and is
free from the usual lights, noise, and dirt of a
busy city. It is undisputed that it has more advantages than are common to the usual subdivision.
"The present market value of the property, as a
whole, for subdivision purposes was valued from
$55,000 to $65,250, or at $1,250 to $1,500 per acre.
The easement sought to be taken cuts diagonally
across the northernmost tip or corner of the
property, runs over five lots and embraces one
and three-quarters acres. The power line and
tower proposed to be built stand 23 or 24 feet
above the highest point on the entire tract. The
construction will interfere with a direct view of
the mountains from some portions of the property,
and will add some hazards to the land."
The testimony of the various appraisers in this case
commenced at $2500.00 and ran as high as $32,200.00. The
award made by the Commissioners was $1500.00 for the
property taken and $8500.00 for severance damage, and
this award was affirmed. At page 39 of the Reporter,
the following statement of the Court is adaptable to the
present case:
28
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*'The easement affected the size and shape of the ^7
tract for development. It rendered one and three $**-& ^
q^rlgx&~-a£x&s^^
for use by the landowners. It necessitated a change in the location
oTTKe streets, the shape and location of the lots
different from that originally planned, and lessened the value of the component parts of the tract,
thereby reducing the value of the property as a
whole. It is true that the damages should not be
added up lot by lot; for instance, by awarding so
much for this one and so much for that. Thehx
damage should be considered from the standpoint / _ /,,
°^ injury to the v^1nft..nf tlm prnpprty as q, ^|)o1eT f ^
\J
takingjinto consideration the elements affecting 1
i t s A d a p t a b i l i t y f o r fWplnpTYiPnf flfl ft piifrfljyiflimi >' /

An early Kansas case, Kansas City & Topeka Ry.
Co. v. Splitlog, decided in 1890, and reported at 25 Pac.
202, contains the following statement by the Court:
" I n cases like this, where the damages are limited
to the value of the land appropriated, the proper
inquiry is what was the market value of such land,
for any present use, in the condition in which it
was immediately prior to its condemnation by the
company. Witnesses testifying as to the value of
such land may consider any use to which the
ground may be presently put in forming their
opinions as to its value, and its surroundings
may be shown to the jury, its nearness to or distance from a town, village, or city, or other improvements that tend to affect its value; but the
jury are to value the land as a whole in the condition in which it was when taken. They have
nothing to do with its subdivision into lots or
blocks. They may consider its location, and the
effect its location has upon its value as a whole;
but the evidence as tlLhow many lots,jj^mmld
make, and what I h ^ y y ^
29
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division, is wholly improper. If an illustration
was wanted to show the impropriety of such evidence, we do not know where we could find a
stronger or more apt one than the evidence this
witness furnishes. The witness is asked the size
of lots on Kansas avenue, the value of such lots, I
and how many such lots an acre^wouldmale, and/
then it drops out that an acre of such lots are
worth $55,000, without improvements; that the
witness paid at that rate per acre. Snch^evidence
is certainly hjgMy_jjnpxaper. It furnishes no
proper measure of value, so far as the land appropriated is concerned, with which alone the jury
has to do, and is well calculated to mislead the
jury by furnishing a false and fanciful measure
of damages. Without going further into this
record, for the reasons given in connection with
these, the first and third assignments, it is recommended that the judgment of the district court
be reversed, and the case remanded for new trial."
A most excellent statement of the law applicable to
these cases is contained in the Colorado case of Wassenich v. City and County of Denver, 186 Pac. 533. On
page 537, the Court states:
"Complaint is made because the court instructed
the jury that it is the present market value at the
time of the trial that is to be determined and
allowed. The statute provides for a special verdict which shall contain the fair, actual cash
market value of the land taken, and the direct,
fair, and actual damages caused by the improvement to the remainder of the property not taken.
Defendant contends he was entitled to the highest \
value that he might be able to obtain in the future; fQJ
by waiting for a better market caused by a demand
for such property, or tvaiting for a customer why
30
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6

would pay on the basis of the most advantageous /
use to which it could be put, reasonably. This isj
not the law. The jury are to determine and allow
the present fair, cash market value at the time of
the trial, and are not to allow for any speculative
or prospective values. In determining the present
cash value the most advantageous use to which
the property may reasonably be applied may be
considered. Any reasonable future use to which
the land may be adapted or applied by men of\
ordinary prudence and judgment may be consid-S
ered in so far only as it may assist the jury inr
arriving at the present market value. The owner
is entitled to have considered the most advan4
tageous use in the future to which the land may^
be reasonably applied, not with the view of allowing him for speculative or prospective damages
or values, but only as such evidence may bear
upon or affect or assist in arriving at the present
market value. It is the duty of the jury to find
and allow no more than the present market value,
no matter what the future prospects may be, and
this character of evidence may be considered only
for the purpose of ascertaining the market value
at the time of the trial. After considering any
and all reasonable uses to which the property may
be put in the future, the question is, taking all
things into consideration, whaLas.^,tke present
market value, not what will or mayJ^4i&*^alue
later on account of some use to whL<^ii-«fifta^be
put in the future. Market value ordinarily means
what price property would bring if sold in the
open market under ordinary and usual circumstances, for cash, assuming that the owner is willing to sell and the purchaser willing to buy, but
neither under any obligation to do so. Sojthe
question for the jury to angrwetf^^
its reasonable availability^
or t h e ^ ^
how much would
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the property bring in cash if offered now for sale s\
f£/
hyjme whoL^j^r^jL^?! w a s n ° t obliged, to sell, ^ A w - and was bought by one who was willing, but not
obliged, to buy. As to the residue, the question
was, how much is the present fair cash market
value of the remainder of the land, not taken,
decreased or diminished in value by reason of
the improvement. The court fully instructed upon
these matters, and we find no errors in this particular. "
We have underlined a portion of the foregoing quotation by way of emphasizing its applicability to the
theory here advanced by the respondents and also because this language is characteristic of the claims of
respondents. They do not want to sell upon an open
market but rather they desire to wait until a sale can
be made by them on their own terms.
A series of California cases have uniformly applied
the rule for which we contend to the effect that the jury
may consider all uses to which the property is reasonably
adaptable, but the final result must be the present market
value of the entire parcel and not what each lot within a
subdivision may sell for at some future time. The first .
of these cases is City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 262 Pac. ^ '
737, which was decided by the Supreme Court of California, and in it the Court said :
" I f the argument of counsel for these appellants
is intended to go one step further, and it is sought
to establish that the value of the land must be
estimated, not only on a basis of a subdivision
possibility, but also on the basis of what the
owners would be able to obtain for the lots after
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subdivision had actually taken place (and the ^
argument is open to that interpretation), we are
IJOJ^^J^OA
unable to agree, nor do the cases relied upon by %A ^ $U*
these appellants support this contention."
d*Ak <
In the case of East Bay Municipal Utility Dist. v.
Kieffer, (Calif.) 278 Pac. 476, at page 480, the court said:
"Speculative and conjectural calculations of
prospective receipts and expenditures and consequent profits to be derived from a prospective
enterprise not only throw no light on the issue
of the market value of the land to be used in the
enterprise, but operate to confuse and mislead the
minds of the j u r o r s . "
And in the case of People v. LaMacchia, 264 P. 2d
15, decided by the Supreme Court of California in an
action to condemn property for a freeway, the following
instruction was fully upheld:

Y

»p>
Q-fd.

" I n this connection, the jury was instructed:
'Whatever purpose the Defendants had in connection with the future use of the property, can
add nothing to its market value. The fact that
this purpose is defeated by condemnation, however much a disappointment, is not a matter of
compensation. A use existing or contemplated on
property is distinct from the market value of the
property itself and is not the conclusive basis for
fixing such market value, and is not to be considered as determining the value of the land.
Value in use is not to be considered by you as
determining the market value of the property. A
plan which Defendants may or may not have had
for the improvement of the property adds nothing
to the market value. The fact that a plan for the
improvement, if any, was affected by condemna33
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tion, however much a disappointment, is not a
matter of compensation.' It must be assumed that
the jury understood such clear and unambiguous
language and correctly applied the instructions to
the evidence.'' Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal.
2d 493, 500, 225 P. 2d 497; Henderson v. Los
Angeles Traction Co., 150 Cal. 689, 697, 89 P. 976.
We have examined many other cases that have held
that a proposed subdivision must be valued as a single
parcel and among these cases are Nantakala Power S\
Light Company v. Moss (No. Car.) 17 S.E. 2d 10; Union]
/
Exploration Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist. (Colo.) 89 \ l^^^
P. 2d 257; CityTof Napa v. Navoni (Calif.) 132 P. 2d 566; } IMf "
City & County of Denver v. Tondall (Colo.) 282 Pac. 191;
and TJwrnton v. Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545,
7 A.L.R. 2d 773.
Also of interest and indicative of the holdings of the
courts of the various states are two cases from Oregon
although it is only proper to note that in this jurisdiction
separate estates in a tract of land sought to be condemned
are not separately assessed but the award is made for
the land and then apportioned among the respective
owners as their interests may appear. This is, of course,
a most literal interpretation of the common law rule
followed in all the states that a proceeding in eminent
domain is a taking of the land and that it is not a taking
of the rights of the owners involved. This rule is relaxed
by the Utah statutes and under the interpretation given
our statutes in the case of Totvn of Perry v. Thomas, 82
Utah 159, 22 P. 2d 343, separate owners in a tract of
34 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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land sought to be condemned are entitled to have their
respective interests separately assessed.
The first case from Oregon is State v. Cerruti, 214 P.
2d 346, where the land to be condemned was used as a
celery farm and the owner sought to show anticipatedjjrofits. The court held that it was error to mstrucflhe
jury that in determining market value they might "consider the profits which a person in the defendants'
position could normally anticipate from the best possible
use of the land."
And in State v. Beat, an Oregon case, 233 P. 2d 242,
the state highway condemned certain property, which had
been prepared for a subdivision and a plat actually submitted for recording although rejected by the county
officials. In that case the following instruction wTas requested by the State:

3

" I instruct you that in determining the fair cash
market value of the real property described in
the complaint as Parcel No. 1, should you find
from the evidence that the highest and best use
of Parcel No. 1 is for subdivision purposes then
Parcel No. 1 may be valued according to its use
for subdivision purposes, but, in no event, irt>
determining the fair cash market value of Parcel
No.l shall you consider the number of lots that\
Parcel No. 1 might be divided into or the value
of such lots as separate parcels."
The portion of the foregoing instruction that we
- have underlined was refused by the trial court and this
V \ ' w a s held to be reversible error. Our Eequested Instrue*

V

N
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tion No. 12 in the present case is similar in form and
substance and we most strenuously contend that it was
a proper statement of the law and that failure to give
that instruction was highly prejudicial to the State of
Utah.
At this juncture, it is necessary to emphasize the
theory adopted by the State appraisers and is referred
to in the record in some instances and specifically by Mr.
Kiepe as the income approach (R. 343). And, in answer
to the question as to what is the income approach, Mr.
Kiepe responded:
'' The income approach is an analysis of the value
of the property based upon what it can produce
in dollars. The income approach sometimes involves the property which has a continuing income
such as an apartment house. An apartment house
would have a constant income. In case of a subdivision of sand and gravel deposit, we have an
income approach, but we have a gradually diminishing or liquid asset, but it is still the income
approach. The income approach is used in all
properties where the ownership is expressly for
profit. It is the prime and elementary and the
final important approach where the purpose of
the ownership of that property is to obtain a
profit. That is true of a duplex. It is true of a
store property. It is true of an office building.
It is true of a sand and gravel deposit. It is true
of a subdivision." (R. 344-345).
And in the application of this income approach to
the properties here involved, Mr. Kiepe commenced with
a figure that in his opinion represented the final gross
36 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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selling price of the lots within a particular area; and,
by way of a paranthetical remark, this is the place where
the appraisers for the Deere Estate stopped. From this
gross sales price, Mr. Kiepe subtracted the necessary
selling costs stated as advertising, abstracts, revenue
stamps, sales commissions, taxes and general overhead
based on the length of time required to dispose of the
property; and also from this gross sales price and, in
each instance depending upon the risk and time involved,
a deduction was made for the risk profit that an owner
would be entitled to which represented interest on the
money invested and a return for the management of the
property and for the services that he necessarily would
render. The final figure arrived at was the fair market
value and it is crystal clear that a buyer of this property
will pay no more than this figure. The evidence of Mr.
Kiepe that has been summarized in this respect is contained on pages 362 to 366 of the record.
We contend that the evidence of Mr. Kiepe and that
of Mr. Ashton and Mr. Solomon, the two other state
appraisers, was the only competent evidence of value
introduced in this trial as to Parcel 1. However, thtT\
trial court not only failed to grant our motion to strike / ' )
the evidence of value as to this parcel presented by re-( Q
spondents, but directed the jury to ignore and give no^j
consideration to the evidence above summarized (R. 79
and 88). We again urge upon this Court that we at least \ )
had the right to have the jury consider our evidence or J )
an equal basis with that of the respondents.
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case of Redwood City Elementary School District v. Gregoire, 276 P. 2d 78, the
School District sought to condemn a parcel of land used
as a summer home and for the sale and shipment of cut
flowers. However, the expert appraisers all agreed that
the highest and best use was for subdivision purposes
and that the land could be divided into approximately
sixty lots. The two appraisers for the school district
gave figures of $78,750.00 and $78,400.00, while the two
appraisers for the owner gave $153,000.00 and $146,750.00; and this last figure was demonstrated &s a mgthe• jrjjsiM matical total qf_the value of each of thejjjixty lots. A
jury returned a verdict of $83,500.00 and the owner appealed. The appellate court affirmed hold that it^was
fc proper to submit both sets o£ values to the jurj^and that
the following instruction was a correct statement of the
applicable law:
C£C£J**<

*nt

"You are instructed that you are to determine
the market value of the 12.23 acre parcel of land
as a whole as of November 14th, 1952, and not
as if it had been divided into small parcels.
"Evidence, if any, of what an owner might plan
to do with the property is not to be considered
by you as enhancing its market value."
Eeferring again to page 18 of this brief, we feel that
we have conclusively demonstrated that Instruction No.
10, as given, and particularly the last sentence thereof,
cannot be upheld. This last sentence says:
"Also as a willing seller, he has the right and it\
must be assumed that he may exercise that right, j
to dispose of the property in such manner a s /
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would result in obtaining its fair market value|
for the highest and best use to which the property
or any of its parts can be adapted."
We submit that this is improper, that there is no time duAW
limitation placed upon it, that the condemnee under the
law has no such right, and that it does violence to the
definition of a willing seller upon an open market to a
willing buyer; and we also submit that failure to give
our Requested Instruction No. 5, under the circumstances
of this case, was error and prejudicial to the State of
Utah.
POINT II.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED THE JURY TO CONSIDER AND TO
ASSESS DAMAGES TO THE WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN THE FOLLOWING PARTICULARS:
(A) THE COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED 1
THE WITNESS, ULLRICH, TO TESTIFY AS
TO VALUES OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION
AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
(B) THE COURT IMPROPERLY RECEIVED*"
EXHIBIT 39D PERTAINING TO VALUES OF
THE WATER DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
(C) THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY DE-V
NIED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
THE EVIDENCE OF THE WITNESSES, BRAYTON AN£> ULLRICH AS TO VALUES OF THE
W A T E R D I S T R I B U T I O N SYSTEM AND
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM.
39
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(D) THAT THE COUBT IMPEOPEELY EEFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S EEQUESTED
INSTEUCTION NO. 19.
(E) THAT THE TEIAL COUET IMPEOPEELY
PERMITTED THE WITNESS BEAYTON TO
T E S T I F Y AS TO VALUES AS HE WAS
NEITHEE AN EXPEET NOE AN OWNEE.
In the decision of this Court in the former appeal
of this case, State v. Peek, supra, the question of the
water system was raised and discussed on page 638 of
the Pacific Eeporter; and it was held that it was error
for the trial court to exclude the evidence offered as to
this water system and as to its value because this evidence would have aided the jury "in arriving at their
overall value of the property." But we do not believe
that this Court intended that this water system was to
be valued separately from the property condemned and,
under the facts as presented, we contend that it was
absolutely impossible to give it a separate valuation and
that it was error to submit that question to the jury.
At this juncture, we are required to call the Court's
attention to the fact that Plaintiff's Eequested Instruction No. 19 does not appear in the record; this instruction reads as follows:
"You are further instructed that the only evidence of value as it pertains to the water works
and water rights of the defendant is that value
of the water rights given by the witness, Ullrich,
and reduced by the witness, Brayton, to the sum
of $11,290.00; and that all other evidence of value
produced by the defendant is incompetent and
40 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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may not be considered by you in arriving at your
verdict."
We excepted to the Court's refusal to give this instruction (E. 518).
The trial court did give an Instruction No. 19 (R.
90), which was satisfactory as far as it went; but we
earnestly urge that the remainder of the requested instruction should also have been given.
Appellant's main contention concerning this question of water distribution and transmission is that the
evidence clearly shows that its value is included within
the values placed by the appraisers upon the land itself
and that to permit the jury to place a separate value
upon it requires the State of Utah to pay for it twice.
In our statement of facts on page 7 of this brief, we
referred briefly to this statement of values made by the
appraisers. Because of its importance in connection with
the present phase of our argument, we feel compelled to
quote the cross-examination of respondents' witness,
Ralph Wright, commencing at the top of page 231 of the
record in this case:
"Q. In connection with the water lines that were
within the Deere Estate property, and, particularly I believe within Parcel 1, you knew, of
course, that that belonged to the Deere Estate,
did you not ?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And did the cost— and did the actual fact
that they were there reflect in your figures for
those lots?
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A. Yes, their presence there did.
Q. And if they had not—
A. (Continued) Was reflected in the values.
Q. And if they had not been there, your figures
would have been lower!
A. That's correct/'
The other two expert appraisers for the respondents
made similar statements (R. 261 and R. 296). And in
order to emphasize this picture, we again repeat the
statement of respondents' witness, Ullrich, when he
stated that at the time of the condemnation this water
collection distribution system had no utility except to
serve the property and lands subject to the condemnation
suit. This witness did state that it could be adapted for
other uses but the respondent offered no evidence as to
what the cost of adaptation would be; and there was,
therefore, no foundation upon which the questions of
value could be propounded to either the witness, Ullrich,
or the witness, Brayton. We objected to the questions
asked Mr. Brayton (R. 317) and we objected to the
introduction of Exhibit 39 (R. 321). And we moved to
strike all of the evidence of values as to this water distribution system (R. 321). All of our objections and
motions were overruled and denied.
The cases we have cited under Point I of this brief
are applicable here and in addition we desire to cite the
case of Kinter v. United States, 156 F. 2d 5, 172 A.L.R.
232, as peculiarly applicable to the problem presented
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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here. In that case the court held that evidence of cost
of(improvements was inadmissible and said:
'i"As stated by Mr. Justice Reed in United States
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 90 L. Ed. 729,
66 S. Ct. 596, 599, 'The Constitution and the
statutes do not define the meaning of just compensation. But it has come to be recognized that just
compensation is the value of the interest taken.
This is not the value to the owner for his particular purposes or to the condemnor for some
special use but a so-called "market value." It
is recognized that an owner often receives less
than the value of the property to him but experience has shown that the rule is reasonably satisfactory.'
" I t has been said that isales at arm's length of
similar property are the best evidence of market
value.' Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 6
Cir. 1939,108 F. 2d 95,101, certiorari denied 1939,
309 U.S. 688, 60 S. Ct. 889, 84 L. Ed. 1030. Even
where there have been no sales of similar property in the vicinity upon which a basis of valuation might be predicated, the quest is still for
'market value.' This may be more or less than
the owner's investment in his property. The government may neither confiscate his bargain nor
be required to assume his loss. But, it is the ' value
of the interest' that is guaranteed; not the investment.
"The owner may, because of his personal knowledge of the property, the uses to which it may be
put, the condition of the improvements erected
thereon, testify as to its market value. May he
also, in the first instance, state as a lump sum the
total of all costs incurred by him over a period
of years for repairs and improvements as bearing
upon the question of fair market value? We think
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not. Admittedly, cost is not synonymous with
market value. A fortiori, cost of land and cost of
improvements taken separately and added are not
to be equalized with fair market value: cf. United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 5 Cir, 1945,149
F. 2d 81; McSorley v. Avalon Borough School
District, 1927, 291 Pa. 252, 255, 139 A. 848."
Also, the annotation in American Law Eeports following the above cited case discuss at some length the
question of the competency of evidence of cost as evidence of value in eminent domain proceedings, and fully
support the position we have taken. And, in addition]]
the case of Provo River Water Users Assoc, v. CarlowA
103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 777, suggests that the evidence!
offered by Mr. Brayton should have been received with;
caution and the jury so instructed.
In another case, A. D. Graham & Co. v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm. (Pa.) 33 A. 2d 22, the court held that
evidence of value could not be sustained by showing cost
when there was no evidence of any market for the property for the purpose for which the cost was offered. The
Court said:
" F o r example, a certain kind of timber might be
useful in the making of bows and arrows but if
there was no market for those implements, the
timber's value for such use could not be shown."
It should be specifically stated that we do recognize
the right of the respondents to recover for the value of
their right to the use of the water from Wagner Spring
and this does not appear to us to be open to question as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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it has long been the law in this state that water and land *****
may be separated. But we strenuously contend that the
^
water transmission and distribution system, as far as
this record is concerned, had no market value except with
the property condemned and that its value is included
within the values placed upon the land.
POINT III.

THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED THE
PLAINTIFF AS TO THE EVIDENCE PROFFERED
BY AND PROPOSED TO BE GIVEN BY THE WITNESSES, SOLOMON AND ASHTON.
Mr. Werner Kiepe, an expert appraiser testifying
on behalf of appellant, gave a very thorough and comprehensive report as to his appraisal detailing the many
steps he took and the many analysis he made in arriving
at his opinion as to the fair market values of the property
here involved. Appellant sought to elicit from Mr. Edward M. Ashton and from Mr. C. Francis Solomon their
detailed analysis of how they arrived at fair market
value and the steps they took, though similar in some
respects, were also different in other respects from those
taken by Mr. Kiepe.
We were prevented from so doing by the objection
of counsel for respondent and the ruling of the trial
court. The colloquy between court and counsel, as shown
commencing on page 430 of the record and c ontinuing
through page 436, not only shows the ruling with respect
to this point but clearly shows the difference in concept
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and theory between the court and counsel for the respondent on the one hand and counsel for the State of
Utah on the other hand.
During the former appeal of this case, State v. Peek,
supra, the same counsel represented the Deere Estate
and he strenuously contended before this Court that he
had been severely limited in both his direct examination
of his own witnesses and in his cross-examination of the
other witnesses. This Court upheld that contention
saying:
" I t (the trial court) excluded on both direct and
cross-examination evidence of the value of the
various elements, items and parts of appellants'
property being condemned in this action. . . . This
was prejudicial error."
We now make the same contention before this Court and
submit that it was prejudicial error for the trial court
to have so curtailed the presentation of the evidence of
values on behalf of the State of Utah.
POINT IV.

THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY GAVE INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AND PERMITTED THE JURY
TO ASSESS AS VALUE THE STREETS WITHIN
THE PROPERTY; THAT THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 14 AND 15 AS TO
OWNERSHIP OF PLATTED STREETS.
The trial court gave Instruction No. 15 (R. 86) to
which appellant duly excepted (R. 517). By this instrucDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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tion the jury was directed to value the interest of respondents in Kennedy Drive. We contend that this was
error first by reason of the fact that Kennedy Drive is
not the subject of, nor included within, the property
sought to be condemned. The 1953 Utah Legislature by
Chapter 122 amended Section 63-11-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and by that amendment removed Kennedy
Drive from the property they had theretofore directed
to be condemned. This action of the Legislature was
upheld in the case of State v. Bird & Evans, Inc., 1 Utah
2d 276, 265 P. 2d 639.
Also, it is to be noted that the trial court gave no
further instructions as to streets within the area and
did not give Plaintiff's Requested Instructions Nos, 14
and 15. There is a note attached to each instruction by
the trial judge stating that each of these instructions
were given in substance but we have carefully examined
each of the instructions given and cannot agree with this
notation; and, in addition, Instruction No. 15 as given
is clearly in conflict with those requested. We duly excepted to the failure to give each of the requested instructions (R. 518).
We respectfully submit that the instruction given
was in error and that the instructions requested correctly
state the law both because Kennedy Drive was not a part
of this condemnation action and because the streets
within the platted section of Parcel 1 belonged either to
the city or the county. The two Utah cases of White v.
Salt Lake City, 239 P. 2d 210, and Boskovich v. Midvale
47Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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City, 243 P . 2d 435, both uphold our contention that a
platted street vests title thereto in either the city or the
county and that the respondents had thereafter no
further interest therein.
POINT V.
T H A T T H E COURT GAVE NO INSTRUCTION A S
TO BURDEN OF P R O O F AND I M P R O P E R L Y R E F U S E D TO GIVE P L A I N T I F F ' S R E Q U E S T E D INSTRUCTION NO. 2 DEALING T H E R E W I T H .
The appellants duly excepted to the trial court's
refusal to give Plaintiff's Requested Instruction No. 2
(R. 517). That instruction reads as follows:
' i You are instructed that the burden of proving
value, and the burden of proving damages, are
burdens which the law puts upon the defendant,
Deere Estate. These burdens of proof are successfully carried by defendant only if you find that
it has established the truth of its contentions by
a preponderance of the evidence. A i preponderance of the evidence' is defined as that amount of
evidence which is more convincing as to its truth,
or which convinces the mind of the jury that a
proposition is more probably true than not true.
Therefore, if you believe that all the evidence is
evenly balanced, you will reject the propositions
advanced by defendant as to value, and as to
damages, and will accept those advanced by
plaintiff."
We should also call this Court's attention to the fact
that no other instruction concerning the burden of proof
was given by the trial court and may we also note that
the respondents were permitted the right to open and
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close in connection with the trial. "We submit that failure
to give the requested instruction was fundamental error
in this cause.
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Section 18.5 at page
198, states the rule as follows:
" F r o m the rule that an award is vacated by appeal and cannot be considered by the jury in
determining damages, it follows that the burden
of proof of establishing his right to substantial
compensation is upon the owner, even if he is
defendant or respondent in the proceedings, since
it is clear (except in the states in which the jury
or other tribunal are entitled to use their own
knowledge of values, or a view of the premises is
considered as evidence) that if no evidence were
introduced by either party, the jury would have
no basis upon which to fix the compensation and
would be bound to award nominal damages only.
Accordingly, it is the law in most jurisdictions
that the burden of proof is upon the owner to
establish his right to recover more than nominal
damages even when his land is taken; and, when
no land of his is taken, if he fails to prove that
the fair market value of his land is perceptibly
decreased by the laying out and construction of
the improvement, he is not entitled even to nominal damages. When there is a partial taking of
land, in the absence of proof by the owner of
diminution in value of the remainder area, he is
limited in his recovery to the value of the land
, actually taken."
This rule was explicitly followed in the case of
Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah
105, 121 Pac. 584, wherein the Court said:
49Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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" I t is also contended that the burden of establishing the amount of damages was upon respondent, and that in any event the court erred in permitting him to enter upon appellants' property
before he had established what was just compensation for appellants' property taken or affected
by his proposed improvement. We think, however, that, under the practice in force in this
jurisdiction, the burden of establishing the quantum of damages was upon the appellants. Such
has always been, and continues to be, the practice
in the district courts of this state. Moreover, such
is the great weight of authority under statutes
similar to ours. In 15 Cyc. 898, the prevailing rule
upon this question is stated as follows: ' The burden of showing necessity and public use is upon
petitioner. The burden of showing the damages
which the owner will suffer rests on him.' In 2
Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) § 645, the rule
is stated to be in accordance with the text quoted
from Cyc, and the author of LewTis' Eminent
Domain, in part at least, collates the cases both
for and against the rule as there stated. In addition to the numerous cases cited by Mr. Lewis,
see, also, Monterey County v. Cushing, 83 Cal.
507, 23 Pac. 700; Los Angeles County v. Reyes
(Cal.) 32 Pac. 233, and cases there cited."
This case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 239 U.S. 323, 60 L.Ed. 307, and has ever
since been the law in this jurisdiction and has been
followed without question in every condemnation case
that we have been able to examine. We submit that the
requested instruction should have been given.
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POINT VI.
THAT THE COUBT IMPROPERLY ASSESSED INTEREST AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF IN COMPUTING THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE VERDICT ON NOVEMBER 5, 1954.
And finally we contend that the trial court erred in
assessing interest in this cause. It will be remembered
that this Court, in the case of State v. Peek, supra, held
that interest was not recoverable in this type of condemnation proceeding until date of judgment and it is
necessary to also note that the first judgment in this
cause in the sum of $495,875.00 was entered on May 27,
1952, but was not paid to the respondents until January
5, 1953.
Therefore, in the Judgment on the Verdict entered
by the trial court on November 5, 1954 (R. 97-99) the
following steps were taken by respondents with respect
to interest. First, the verdict and judgment in this cause
rendered by the jury on Nivember 5, 1954, in the total
sum of $632,145.00, is related back to May 27, 1952, and
interest on this full amount is charged to January 5,
1953, at the rate of 8 percent per annum, or the sum of
$31,888.09, and this is then added to the judgment. This
total of $664,033.09 is then credited with the payment
of $495,875.00, leaving a balance of $168,158.09; and this
amount is then charged with 8 percent per annum interest
computed to November 5, 1954, totalling $24,663.10, and
this added to the remainder of $168,158.09 above, makes
the total of $192,821.19 for which judgment has now been
taken and entered.
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Two questions present themselves: first, is it proper
to relate the second judgment back to the first for the
purpose of charging and collecting interest; and second,
if it is proper to so relate the second judgment back, is
it proper to charge interest at the rate of 8 percent per
annum.
The answer to the first question requires a further
interpretation of this Court's ruling in State v. Peek,
supra, and of our statutes. It is true that following the
judgment entered on the first trial and its payment, a
final order of condemnation was made and entered in
favor of the State of Utah and it would be most difficult
to now argue that this did not constitute " t h e actual
t a k i n g " of the property. However, in view of the complex nature of this judgment, the positive and mandatory
language of the statute that we have quoted on the first
page of this brief and the fact that a state agency is
involved, we have felt it to be the better practice to call
the matter to this Court's attention for their ruling on
the matter.
However, with respect to the second question, we are
of the firm opinion that the Utah case of State v. Danielson, 247 P . 2d 900, is controlling and that the interest on
this second judgment as it exceeds the first judgment
must be limited to 6 percent per annum until the actual
entry of that judgment on November 5, 1954. That case
held that interest at 6 percent per annum from the date
of an order for immediate occupancy to the entry of final
judgment was proper and we contend that the present
situation is no different in principal.
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CONCLUSION
By way of summation, we are desirous of emphasizing that the verdict and judgment from which this appeal
is taken gave to the Deere Estate the market value of
their property, insured to them all of the profit they
could possibly hope to realize from the individual sale
of each lot in Parcel 1 thereof, no matter how long it
might have taken to make those sales, and all of this
without any cost or expense to them and assuredly there
would have been some cost; and in addition they are
also entitled to interest on the judgment, albeit that interest did not commence to run for a period of slightly
more than nine months after the commencement of the
original condemnation action. Certainly the statutes do
not contemplate in eminent domain proceedings that the
State of Utah shall underwrite for each defendant an
unearned profit.
We respectfully submit that the appellant, State of
Utah, is entitled to, and should be granted, a new trial
of this cause.
Eespectfully submitted,
E. E. CALLISTEE
Attorney General
EOBEET B. POETEE
Assistant Attorney General
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